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Government Preferences on European Integration:
An Empirical Test of Five Theories
MARK ASPINWALL*
This essay examines the causes of government support for European integration. It evaluates several competing
theories, both material and ideological. Two dependent variables are examined: government support for
European integration in Council of Ministers decisions, and in the 1997 Amsterdam intergovernmental
conference. There appear to be sharp differences between the two decision-making fora in the efficacy of
predictive variables. In the Council of Ministers, left–right political ideology and financial transfers from the
European Union to member states provide the best explanations. In the Amsterdam conference, experience
in the Second World War and financial transfers provide the best explanations. This research extends our
understanding of why governments choose co-operation within the European Union. It also extends our
understanding of the relationship between ideology and integration preferences. Ideology matters not just to
parties, but also to governments, which represent both territorial interests and ideologies. There appears to be
a linear relationship, whereby left governments are more supportive of integration than right governments.
The purpose of this article is to examine the causes of government preferences on European
integration. It tests five competing hypotheses about why governments might support or
oppose common policies and institutional strengthening in the European Union (EU), all
of which are plausible means of determining government preferences. One of them is
ideological – left–right socio-economic position. One is historical – experience in the
Second World War. Two are material – trade levels and net receipts from the EU. The fifth
is the effect of public opinion.
Locating this essay in the general debate between rationalism and constructivism, the
findings support the constructivist interpretation of social interaction.1 Ideas matter to
government preferences. However, it is ideas that stem from domestic politics, not
international organizations, that are important. This may be contrasted to Finnemore, who
focuses on the ways national interests are defined by international norms.2 ‘Interests are
not just “out there” waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social
interaction … states are socialized to want certain things by the international society in
which they and the people in them live.’ International organizations help shape what states
want by the spread of norms and values. She does not believe that examining domestic
politics will reveal all the sources of national interests: ‘domestic politics and local
conditions cannot explain many of the interests articulated and policy choices made.’3
Political parties, whose programmes and positions are conditioned and constrained by their
* School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh.
1 For reviews of this debate, see Peter Katzenstein,, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner, ‘International
Organization and the Study of World Politics’, International Organization, 52 (1998), 645–85. See also the other
contributors to the special issue of International Organization in the autumn of 1998. Also see Thomas Risse,
‘Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization, 54 (2000), 1–39; James
Fearon and Alexander Wendt, ‘Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas
Risse and Beth Simmons, eds, Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 52–72.
2 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
3 Both quotes are from Finnemore, National Interests, p. 2.
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ideologies, have political ‘identity’. This identity is transnational in the sense that political
ideologies generate similar worldviews across states, but it is also rooted in domestic
idiosyncrasies. It often generates a view about whether European integration is appropriate
or not. Much recent research has shown a strong correlation between party ideology and
integration preferences across member states of the European Union. What I show here
is that these correlations may be extended to governments: government preferences are
linked to ideology too.
European integration represents an important example of international co-operation, in
which states agree to forgo certain types of behaviour in exchange for greater uniformity
in behavioural standards, greater certainty and information about the behaviour of other
states, the ability to detect and punish defectors, and other gains which reduce the
transaction costs of international interaction, thereby permitting greater economic
specialization. Understanding the sources of government preferences regarding inter-
national co-operation is important because, although it is possible to identify long-term
gains from international co-operation, it also brings with it a very real loss of national
authority. When states agree to accept binding rules supervised by international
organizations, they face a corresponding reduction in their ability to act domestically.4 The
choice is important for domestic politics because it affects social and economic actors –
including political parties, interest groups, social movements and others – in different
ways.
One of the most important forms of international co-operation in contemporary life is
the integration of the European Union. European integration is contentious precisely
because it affects domestic interests in different ways. Ultimately, member states make
choices about accepting or rejecting integration on the basis of a calculation of the national
interest. Domestic considerations are part of this calculation. In addition, strategic
interaction at the EU level, bargaining, trade-offs and an evolution of interests and
objectives resulting from a ‘constructed’ identity are all possible contributing factors. This
study tests several domestic factors statistically, using data that are not available for
potential international factors. The five I have chosen to examine all represent testable
measures of the ‘national condition’, and they are deductively plausible causes of
government preferences on European integration. Scholars have made claims for the
importance of others as well, some of which are more difficult to operationalize in a
statistical context. These five are operationalizable, but it must be recognized that their
selection represents a limit to the generalizability of these findings.
For much of the history of European integration, member states have kept secret their
preferences on specific proposals of European integration. This meant that scholars
interested in examining preferences had to glean information on an ad hoc basis from
insiders.5 In the past decade that culture of secrecy has begun to change. There are now
sources of data on decisions in the Council of Ministers, provided by the Council
Secretariat, which enable analysts to see for themselves how member states vote on
legislative proposals put to them.6 There is also a survey on interim government positions
4 There are exceptions whereby states can have both domestic autonomy and international rules. One is
cheating; another is when no pre-existing national rule is curtailed by supranational rules. In general, however,
the trade-off is real and significant.
5 See, for example, Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community’, International Organization, 45 (1991), 19–56.
6 These data are available online at http://ue.eu.int/cms3 applications/showPage.ASP?id551&lang
en&modeg. Last accessed on 4 September 2005.
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on more than 250 proposals under consideration at the Amsterdam intergovernmental
conference. Unusually for European Union politics, a record of these positions was
published in a report in 1997 by the European Parliament, providing a rare and empirically
valuable insight into the talks on matters ranging from strengthening the powers of the
European Parliament to providing a greater role for the European Union in foreign policy.7
These two sources of data enable two different measures of the dependent variable –
government decisions about international co-operation – to be analysed. Both have been
subjected to scrutiny by scholars, but I extend their work in several important respects.8
THE SOURCES OF INTEGRATION PREFERENCES
Transactionalist literature leads us to believe that trade (and other forms of interaction)
between member states may affect their views about the efficacy of European integration.9
The reason is that governments, as rational actors, seek to maximize opportunities for
economic actors; that instituting supranational rules helps increase opportunities for
economic actors; and that rejecting these rules ‘raises the costs’ to governments. Frieden
makes a similar argument: using trade levels as a proxy for private interests, he finds that
governments are more willing to engage in exchange rate stabilization as trade rises.10
Rising trade is measured by the level of trade to EU member states as a percentage of all
foreign trade. Given this straightforward relationship, it is quite simple to construct a
hypothesis about the relationship between trade and support for European integration:
HYPOTHESIS 1 Support for measures of European integration will vary in direct proportion
to the percentage of trade to EU member states. As trade rises, so will
support for European integration.
There is on the face of it every reason to expect public opinion to form an important
motivating factor in government positions on Europe, since these democracies often have
the reputation of carefully following opinion polls and surveys, conducting focus group
research to determine optimal policy choice, and ‘spinning’ or ‘contextualizing’ decisions
7 See European Parliament, Positions Re´sume´es des Etats Membres et du Parlement Europe´en sur la
Conference intergouvenmentale de 1996, JF/bo/290/97, Luxembourg, 12 May 1997. This data source was also
used by Simon Hug and Thomas Ko¨nig ‘In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic
Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference’, International Organization, 56 (2002), 447–76.
To my knowledge similar reports are not available for other intergovernmental conferences. The only version of
this report I have been able to locate is published in French.
8 Mattila tests the influence of political ideology, financial transfers to member states, the government’s support
for integration, member-state voting power, and the presidency on member-state support for Council measures.
See Mikko Mattila, ‘Contested Decisions: Empirical Analysis of Voting in the EU Council of Ministers’, European
Journal of Political Research, 43 (2004), 29–50. My earlier research found a correlation between government
ideology and integration preferences in the 1997 Amsterdam IGC. See Mark Aspinwall, ‘Preferring Europe:
Ideology and National Preferences on European Integration’, European Union Politics, 3 (2001), 81–111.
9 Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz, ‘European Integration and Supranational Governance’, Journal of
European Public Policy, 4 (1997), 297–317. Neil Fligstein and Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Institutionalizing the Treaty
of Rome’, in Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz and Neil Fligstein, eds, The Institutionalization of Europe
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 29–55.
10 Jeffry Frieden, ‘Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary
Integration’, International Organization, 56 (2002), 831–60. For a related argument, see Jeffry Frieden and Ronald
Rogowski, ‘The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview’, in Robert
Keohane and Helen Milner, eds, Internationalization and Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), pp. 25–47.
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to maximize public acceptance. However, research on public opinion and European
integration is less straightforward than seems to be the case with trade. Major works have
addressed the causes of individual support/opposition to integration, including post-
material values, cognitive mobilization and economic self-interest.11
Gabel and Palmer find that ‘the public forms attitudes that are consistent with their
inherent interests in European integration’ and they go on to recommend that national
politicians and EU officials pay close attention to the different effects of integration on
different groups.12 Gabel looks at the determinants of public support for the European
Parliament, finding that the most critical factor is support for EU membership.13 Where
support for EU membership is high, so is support for the European Parliament. Other
factors influencing support for the European Parliament include attachment to democratic
values at the EU level, beliefs about the appropriate scope of EU authority, and the extent
to which respondents are well informed about the European Union.
But how do we know whether this opinion affects government preferences? Little
research suggests a strong ‘push’ role for public opinion, in which citizens drive integration
by influencing government preferences.14 Wessels suggests that parties are responsible for
mobilizing the support of their constituencies on European integration, but also finds that
party manifestos reflect the concerns of their voters on Europe. This latter point is echoed
by Carrubba, who finds evidence that elites are responding to electoral pressure and
weakly-held public preferences over integration.15 They do not stray far enough from these
weak preferences to excite opposition among the public.
Hewstone and Carrubba have measured party positions on Europe, derived from party
manifesto data, rather than government positions. Nugent, looking at the British
government, explains, ‘with most voters largely uninterested in, and uninformed about,
Community affairs it was inevitable that many should, on the Community issue, tend to
follow the lead and reflect the views of their chosen political leaders and parties.’16 This
may be because governments have largely been able to keep their preferences secret from
the public.
11 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1990); Matthew Gabel, Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Matthew Gabel and Guy Whitten, ‘Economic Conditions,
Economic Perceptions, and Public Support for European Integration’, Political Behavior, 19 (1997), 81–96;
Richard Eichenberg and Russell Dalton, ‘Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public
Support for European Integration’, International Organization, 47 (1993), 507–34; Simon Hix, The Political
System of the European Union (London: Macmillan, 1999); Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, ‘Calculation,
Community, and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration’ (unpublished manuscript, Chapel Hill, University
of North Carolina, 2004).
12 Matthew Gabel and Harvey Palmer, ‘Understanding Variation in Public Support for European Integration’,
European Journal of Political Research, 27 (1995), 3–19.
13 Matthew Gabel, ‘Public Support for the European Parliament,’ Journal of Common Market Studies,
41 (2003), 289–308.
14 For reviews, see Miles Hewstone, Understanding Attitudes to the European Community (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 18–20; also Bernhard Wessels, ‘Support for Integration: Elite or Mass
Driven?’ in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott, eds, Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 137–62.
15 Clifford Carrubba, ‘The Electoral Connection in European Union Politics’, Journal of Politics, 63 (2001),
141–58.
16 Neill Nugent, ‘British Public Opinion and the European Community’, in Stephen George, ed., Britain and
the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp. 172–201, at p. 191.
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However, one interesting study found that the longer the time period following a national
election, the more influence a European election is likely to have on the governing parties
in the subsequent national election.17 The reason is that voters appear to use a more recent
European election as a ‘marker’ for the national election rather than a distant prior national
election. Therefore, public opinion on Europe (expressed through elections) may have an
influence on national politics regarding Europe, because governments will be wary about
losing support in European elections and may accommodate public concerns in the run-up
to them. Given the expected effect of public opinion in democracies, the hypothesis is as
follows:
HYPOTHESIS 2 Support for measures of European integration will vary in direct proportion
to levels of public support for the European Union. High public support for
the European Union is expected to lead to high support for integration by
member-state governments.
Likewise, rising expenditure by the European Union in the member states plausibly
raises the costs to governments of rejecting integrative proposals. Carrubba looks at why
financial transfers are provided to member states.18 He finds that they are provided to
overcome domestic political repercussions associated with further integration, rather than
to alleviate economic need. I take the reverse approach – looking at net financial transfers
as an independent variable. Countries that receive high levels of disbursements from the
European Union have every incentive to keep the money flowing, and risk interruptions
if they obstruct the agreement of common policies or institutional change. Mattila surmises
that it may work in reverse: that member states making net contributions may feel they
have ‘bought themselves more weight’ and are entitled to reject integration proposals.19
However, conventional wisdom is that transfers represent side-payments (to the extent that
they are more than developmental tools), buying poor member-state agreement.20 Thus,
from this perspective, there should be a positive relationship between EU payments in
member states and support for integrative proposals.
HYPOTHESIS 3 Support for measures of European integration will vary in direct proportion
to net financial transfers to member states. As net transfers rise,
member-state support for integration is also expected to rise.
Historical experience provides a further plausible means of distinguishing between
member-state positions on European integration.21 Constructing a narrative about what the
‘self’ means in relation to the ‘other’ may produce distinct, nationally-based, conceptions
of the appropriateness, utility or desirability of European integration. Risse and Marks and
Hooghe have shown that exclusive national identity among citizens of EU member states
is associated with low support for European integration.22
17 Matthew Gabel, ‘European Integration, Voters, and National Politics’, West European Politics, 23 (2000),
52–72.
18 Clifford Carrubba, ‘Net Financial Transfers in the EU: Who Gets What and Why’, Journal of Politics, 59
(1997), 469–96.
19 Mattila, ‘Contested Decisions’, p. 34.
20 Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act’; Carrubba, ‘Net Financial Transfers’.
21 For a detailed examination of the role of social cognitive structure, discursive formation and identity in
Russian foreign policy, see Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign
Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002).
22 Thomas Risse, ‘The Euro between National and European Identity’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10
(2003), 487–505; Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, ‘National Identity and European Integration: A Multilevel
Analysis of Public Opinion’ (unpublished paper, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2003).
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In much of the literature on Europe, the experience of the Second World War is assumed
to be a driving cognitive force behind nationally-specific positions on integration.23 There
is no a priori reason why ‘losers’ should be pro-EU and vice versa, but there is a very
deeply-held and widespread assumption among both policy makers and scholars that
wartime experience powerfully affects attitudes towards integration. In fact, the war
provided much of the impetus to set up the original treaties leading to the European Union.
Marcussen et al. point out that, in Germany, the horrors of Nazism led to a wholesale
change in the political culture after the war, whereas in France, a more gradual rethinking
of the national role in world politics led to a political realignment of much of the national
elite.24
In Britain, the experience of victory produced greater reluctance to be associated with
the European project. British negativism towards integration is often associated with the
experience of wartime, just as German positivism is associated with the experience of
Nazism. In order to reinvent themselves as responsible members of the international
community, Axis members and satellites have adopted ‘Europe’ as part of their identity,
whereas in Britain this was unnecessary. As Margaret Thatcher (over)stated, ‘All my life,
our problems, our wars, have come from mainland Europe. All my life the upholding of
liberty has come from the English-speaking peoples of the world.’ It could be argued that
focusing on the Second World War experience does not allow for changes in national
identity to be observed. However, it is precisely this fixed historical experience that both
politicians and academics often point to in explaining ideational attitudes to integration.
HYPOTHESIS 4 Support for measures of European integration will vary by member state.
Those states on the ‘losing’ side will be most supportive of integration.
Those on the ‘winning’ side will be least supportive.
Political ideology is the final variable. The ideological beliefs held by politicians and
political parties enable them to be placed on the left–right spectrum, because ideology acts
as a constraint on the policy positions taken by both individuals and parties.25 For example,
it is widely assumed that socialist parties are constrained in the positions they can take on
employment and economic growth by the underlying ideology upon which their party is
founded. Left–right space does not capture all dimensions of political conflict. Policy
dimensions have differing levels of saliency among different states, as Laver and Hunt
point out.26 There are diverse perceptions of what the main conflicts are within any given
state at any particular time.
Nonetheless, left and right continue to provide a landscape by which we map ideology.
New cleavages that have emerged in West European politics get assimilated into the
left–right discourse. Left and right help us reduce the transaction costs of understanding
the positions of political parties. As Oddbjorn Knutsen writes, ‘the language of “left” and
23 See Hix, The Political System, p. 144. Obviously there are many different contributing factors in historical
experience. However, focusing on experience in the Second World War has the advantage of being
operationalizable, a task I undertake shortly.
24 Martin Marcussen et al. ‘Constructing Europe: The Evolution of French, British and German Nation State
Identities’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6 (1999), 614–33.
25 Matthew Gabel and John Huber, ‘Putting Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left–Right Ideological
Positions from Party Manifestos Data’, American Journal of Political Science, 44 (2000), 94–103.
26 Michael Laver and Ben Hunt, Policy and Party Competition (London: Routledge, 1992).
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“right” helps citizens as well as elites to orient themselves in a complex political
landscape’.27
The relationship between government ideology and support for integration is complex.
The basis for hypothesizing such a relationship lies in research on political parties, which
has shown a strong correlation between party ideology and support for (or opposition to)
European integration.28 Generalizing somewhat, two broad sets of findings have emerged
from research by the ‘Chapel Hill School’. The first is that ideology matters because leftist
parties support integration and rightist parties oppose it.29 The reason for greater support
among left parties is that as European integration matures, it is less concerned with market
opening and deregulation, and more concerned with countering the effects of capitalism.
European regulated capitalism is favoured by parties of the left. Gabel and Hix extend this
mapping to the EU level, with results largely confirming those found at national level.30
The most significant dimension of party competition on Europe is the traditional
socio-economic left–right dimension.
The second finding is that ideology matters because centrist parties are supportive of
integration, while support declines as parties move away from the centre. Here the
important factor is not whether a party is left or right, but how far from the centre it is.
The theorized reason for this relationship is that centrist parties show consistent ideological
adherence to orthodox economic openness and stability; leftist parties reject European
integration on socialist anti-market grounds; rightist parties reject integration on the
grounds of preserving national identity or economic self-determination. Fringe parties on
either left or right may oppose the EU’s remote, technocratic, anti-individualist tendencies.
Scholars have found empirical support for this approach as well.31
Does the relationship between political parties and integration support extend to
governments? On the face of it, there is no reason to suppose a stable relationship between
government ideology and support for integration. Legislative proposals at the EU level may
be affected by the extent to which member state governments happen to be left versus right.
A particular government may be relatively isolated ideologically, and this may change over
time. But given the strong relationship between party ideology and integration support, it
27 Oddbjorn Knutsen, ‘Expert Judgements of the Left–Right Location of Political Parties: A Comparative
Longitudinal Study’, West European Politics, 21 (1998) 63–94, p. 63. See also Hans-Dieter Klingemann, ‘Party
Positions and Voter Orientations’, in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds, Citizens and the State
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Laver and Hunt, Policy and Party Competition, chap. 3.
28 See, for example, Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Carole Wilson, ‘Does Left/Right Structure Party
Positions on European Integration?’ Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 965–89; Aspinwall, ‘Preferring
Europe’; Simon Hix, ‘Dimensions and Alignments in European Union Politics: Cognitive Constraints and Partisan
Responses’, European Journal of Political Research, 35 (1999), 69–106; Leonard Ray, ‘Measuring Party
Orientations towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey’, European Journal of Political
Research, 36 (1999), 283–306; Gary Marks and Carole Wilson, ‘The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of
Party Response to European Integration’, British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 433–59.
29 Hooghe et al., ‘Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions?’ This glosses over some nuances. Hix,
‘Dimensions and Alignments’, argues that the situation depends on the member state. Anti-integrationism may
be found either on the left or the right. Marks and Wilson, ‘The Past in the Present’, also examine the variation
in party support for integration within party families. They find national-specific factors accounting for this
variation: for example, social democratic parties differ according to the level of social democracy in place at the
national level, and conservative parties differ according to the tension between neoliberalism and nationalism.
30 Matthew Gabel and Simon Hix, ‘Defining the EU Political Space: An Empirical Study of the European
Elections Manifestos, 1979–1999’, Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 934–64.
31 Aspinwall, ‘Preferring Europe’; Marks and Wilson, ‘The Past in the Present’; Ray, ‘Measuring Party
Orientations’.
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seems sensible to test this empirically for governments as well. The next two hypotheses
are designed to determine the answer.
HYPOTHESIS 5 Support for measures of European integration will decline as governments
move to the right in left–right ideological space.
HYPOTHESIS 6 Support for measures of European integration will decline as governments
move away from the centre in left–right ideological space.
OPERATIONALIZING THE VARIABLES
Dependent Variables
The first six years of publicly available Council of Ministers decisions (1994–99) were
indexed for each year and each member state to determine the percentage of proposals
supported.32 This source is a ‘summary of definitive legislative acts adopted by the Council,
together with votes against and abstentions.’ In other words, it includes all acts approved
by the Council of Ministers for a given year. It includes different types of acts (such as
regulations and directives), made under different decision-making rules (co-decision,
co-operation, etc.), and different voting rules (qualified majority and unanimity). Many of
the acts were passed without votes against or abstentions by member states, but some did
attract opposition.
While this dataset is extremely valuable in showing member state support for various
measures under consideration in the Council, it can be difficult to infer support for
integration per se from the data. There are at least two reasons for this. First, many of the
measures are technical in nature, and have no implications for the balance of power
between the EU institutions and the member states. Secondly, it is difficult to know which
of the measures potentially contravene national interests, and in what ways, without a
detailed examination of all of them (more than one thousand altogether), which this study
has not sought to do.
Recognizing these inherent limits, it is still worth considering whether the independent
variables in this study help explain government choice in the Council. Two approaches
are put forward. First, I examine all Council decisions, and take the percentage of decisions
supported by each government as the dependent variable (Table 1). Secondly, I
examine only those legislative acts for which abstentions or negative votes were recorded
(Table 2). The reason for this second approach is the assumption that where states are
registering official opposition or abstention it is likelier that national interests are perceived
to be at stake, and therefore examining how well domestic factors predict positions should
yield different results.33 The tables show the number of proposals in question and the
percentage levels of support by member states in various years.
Coding was as follows: if a government supported a measure in the Council of Ministers,
it was given a value of 1. If it abstained, it was given a value of 0.5. If it voted against,
32 See Mikko Mattila and Jan-Erik Lane, ‘Why Unanimity in the Council? A Roll Call Analysis of Council
Voting’, European Union Politics, 2 (2001), 31–52. I am indebted to the authors for making their data available.
33 I do not pretend that this is a foolproof way of approximating a policy that contravenes the national interest,
but, in the absence of full information on the content of the proposal, it seems a valid way to proceed. It makes
sense to concentrate on contentious decisions. No votes and abstentions are indicators of contention, and one of
the most important sources of contention are policies that are believed to contravene the national interest.
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it was given a value of 0.34 The percentage of proposals supported was then calculated for
each member state and each year.35 Observations are available for member state voting
in the Council from 1994 to 2001 (15 member states times 8 years equals 120), but because
of limitations on the independent variables, the N in statistical tests is somewhat below that
figure. Interestingly, the table shows that the ‘motors of integration’ are somewhat less
enthusiastic about Council measures than conventional wisdom would lead us to believe.
France is near the bottom of the league table of support, and Germany is in the lower half.
Smaller states tend to be most supportive. France is also second from the bottom of the
table in support for Amsterdam proposals, with Germany eighth (of fifteen).
Secondly, positions on 135 issues in fourteen areas in the Amsterdam Intergovernmental
Conference were coded according to whether the government supported the issue or not
(see Table 3 for the issue areas). The criterion for accepting an issue for coding was that
it represents an increase (or potential increase) in the authority of the European Union.
Where new policies would be given a treaty base or where existing policies would be
further communautarized, they were included. Where the EU institutions were given
increased powers, or national authority to veto was potentially eroded, they were included.
The trade-off therefore was between supranationalization and national control. This set of
criteria excluded institutional ‘streamlining’, and where the effect was uncertain, the issue
was excluded.
Coding for the Amsterdam data was similar to the Council data: where the government
favoured the adoption of the measure it was given a value of 1. Where it opposed the
measure it was given a value of 0. Where it entered a reservation or a partial acceptance,
it was given a value of 0.5. If the government had no position then that particular issue
TABLE 3 Amsterdam IGC Negotiating Areas
Policy/institutional area Number of issues
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 18
Defence 5
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 17
Citizenship 18
Environment 8
Employment 10
New policies 9
Budget 2
Fraud 4
EP 15
Council 4
Commission 4
European Court of Justice and other institutions 14
Subsidiarity, transparency, flexibility 7
Total 135
34 It could be argued that abstentions should also be given a value of zero, since abstaining governments refuse
to support a measure. However, the intent is to create categorical distinctions based on real behavioural differences,
and it is assumed that abstaining does not represent as strong an objection as voting against.
35 This yields an annual index of support for European integration in the Council of Ministers. Mattila’s
approach, by contrast, is to count the number of no votes and abstentions in six-month periods.
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TABLE 4 Government Positions in Fourteen Amsterdam Areas, with Aggregates
A B Dk Fi F D Gr Ire I L N P Sp Sw UK
CFSP 64 81 32 38 35 61 64 25 77 81 82 54 69 30 14
Def 20 100 67 20 80 80 50 13 80 100 90 40 80 30 0
JHA 81 79 38 96 69 81 96 86 86 77 77 65 80 71 24
Cit 94 88 50 88 77 89 93 58 93 79 92 90 86 55 34
Env 71 100 86 80 67 85 80 100 100 83 100 75 75 86 80
Emp 100 100 100 100 60 75 100 100 100 100 88 100 96 100 69
New 63 75 20 17 25 40 80 67 89 17 0 83 38 20 0
Budget 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 0 0 50 0 50 0
Fraud 100 75 100 33 50 50 100 100 100 75 100 100 100 100 100
EP 50 75 70 33 14 67 92 63 78 56 67 38 71 50 0
Council 25 75 17 44 31 50 50 38 100 75 63 63 17 50 0
Comm 67 100 0 0 0 33 67 67 50 75 100 38 0 0 0
Misc 100 83 100 57 25 79 100 50 33 78 75 58 86 70 25
Flex 79 92 70 80 20 100 75 83 95 75 100 100 57 71 0
External 50 86 39 33 47 66 60 21 78 86 84 50 72 30 11
Internal 83 87 60 73 60 73 93 84 93 72 75 78 75 68 37
All pol 76 87 55 61 57 71 85 68 89 76 78 71 74 59 30
Inst 71 84 57 45 18 68 81 61 69 70 79 57 65 51 6
All 74 86 54 57 47 70 84 66 84 74 78 67 71 56 23
Note: Figures represent the percentage of proposals in each area that the government supported.
External policiesCFSP and defence. Internal policies JHA, citizenship, environment,
employment, new policies, budget and fraud. InstitutionsEP, Council, Commission,
miscellaneous institutions, and flexibility. See Table 1 for names of member states.
was removed from the N for that government. For each of the fourteen policy and
institutional areas a value of between 0 and 1 was obtained by calculating the mean of
positions in that area. Aggregate means were also calculated for external policies, internal
policies, all policies, institutional change and all issues together. Those member states with
values closest to 1.0 were most supportive of integration; those with values closest to zero
were least supportive.
Table 4 shows the percentage of proposals each government was willing to support.
Belgium supported 86 per cent of proposals, and Britain supported 23 per cent. The
strikingly low level of support by the British government may be due to the party
management problems John Major faced during this period and the fact that Britain had
recently concluded a policy of ‘non-cooperation’ because of its opposition to the export
ban on British beef. Within certain areas Britain’s support was high – for example, the
British government backed 80 per cent of the environmental proposals and 100 per cent
of the fraud proposals. In general, however, the list corresponds with the putative rank of
‘Europhile’ and ‘Eurosceptic’ member state, although some countries with strongly
pro-European reputations, such as Luxembourg, Germany and Ireland, show less support
for the Amsterdam proposals than might be expected.
Independent Variables
The next step is to operationalize the independent variables. The Trade variable is simply
exports to fellow EU member states, as a percentage of all exports. Public opinion measures
100 A S P I N W A L L
Fig. 1. Scatterplot of status in the Second World War and support for Amsterdam proposals
X axis key: 1Allied power, 2neutral, 3occupied, 4Axis satellite, 5Axis power.
belief in the benefits of EU membership, as reported in Eurobarometer. Net financial
payments to member states is available on the official EU website.36 It is calculated as net
payments as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) to control for effect on the
economy. Experience during the Second World War is calculated by placing states in one
of five categories – allied power, neutral, occupied, axis satellite and axis power. Map 11,
‘Europe at the Height of Hitler’s Power’, in Paul Kennedy’s Rise and Fall of the Great
Powers, is used as the source.37 This glosses over some nuances, such as the difference
between ‘neutral’ Spain and neutral Sweden. Also, for the purposes of this study, Austria
is assumed to be an axis satellite rather than part of greater Germany (and therefore part
of the axis powers).
A scatterplot in Figure 1 suggests that support for Amsterdam proposals rises as one
moves from ‘winning’ to ‘losing’ states in the Second World War. It is true that much
of this apparent relationship is driven by the outlier status of Britain, and the level of
correlation declines when it is removed from the analysis. Likewise, in regression analysis,
the Second World War status is weaker with Britain removed. Second World War deaths
36 Commission of the European Communities, Allocation of 2000 EU Operating Expenditure by Member
State, Budget Directorate General, Brussels, 2001. See also http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/agenda2000/
reports en.htm (last accessed on 4 September 2005).
37 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 351.
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are another means of approximating the effect of the conflict on the national consciousness,
and so military and civilian deaths per capita are employed as an alternative variable
here.38
Deciding how to calculate Government ideology presents us with some problems, and
the remainder of this section is devoted to solving them. I begin with a measure of party
ideology. There are several means of determining the left–right placement of political
parties (I use two of them), and at least three ways of converting party ideology into
government ideology, because the exact measure of government ideology is debatable.
Laver and Schofield provide an overview of the various studies that had been conducted
to that point on measuring party ideology, and they enumerate four specific methods of
determining party placement: expert survey, legislative behaviour, mass survey data, and
content of policy documents.39 I use the first and last, because of their relative reliability
and availability.
Expert surveys have the advantage of relying on several local experts, who are asked
to place parties in left–right space. They have been criticized, but they are widely believed
to have utility in determining independently the ideological location of political parties,
and I use three of these surveys here.40 The first was conducted in 1983 by Francis Castles
and Peter Mair, and the second was conducted in 1992 by John Huber and Ronald
Inglehart.41 They were supplemented and updated by a survey conducted by Gary Marks
and Marco Steenbergen.42
The second means of determining party ideology is by comparing party manifesto
content. This provides more consistent data, extending from 1945 to 1998 in a large
database assembled by Ian Budge and his collaborators.43 There are fifty-six specific
policy categories, which these researchers used to place each sentence of each party
manifesto for these years, where the manifestos were available. However, there are also
38 Most of this information was obtained from I.C.B. Dear, ed., Oxford Companion to the Second World War
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). Population information was obtained from the UN Population Division.
Encyclopaedia Britannica and the Harper Collins Atlas of the Second World War were used for Denmark and
Spain respectively. These latter two figures were obtained from the following website: http://users.erols.com/
mwhite28/warstat2.htm (last accessed on 4 September 2005).
39 Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 245.
40 For critiques, see Ian Budge, ‘Theory and Measurement of Party Positions’, in Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter
Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum, eds, Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for
Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1945–1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 75–90, at p. 75;
Michael McDonald and Silvia Mendes, ‘Checking the Party Policy Estimates: Convergent Validity’, in Budge
et al., eds, Mapping Policy Preferences, pp. 127–41; Laver and Schofield, Multiparty Government; Ian Budge,
‘Expert Judgements of Party Policy Positions: Uses and Limitations in Political Research’, European Journal of
Political Research, 37 (2000), 103–13. On the other hand, Powell uses expert surveys of party ideology in his
landmark study. See G. Bingham Powell, Elections as Instruments of Democracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 2000). Moreover, in a highly regarded examination of the use of manifesto data for determining
left–right party positions, Gabel and Huber, ‘Putting Parties in their Place’, use expert surveys as the critical
standard; they cite the close correlation between the various expert surveys and refer to the widespread use of them
as reasons to accept their underlying validity.
41 Francis Castles and Peter Mair, ‘Left–Right Political Scales: Some “Expert Judgements”,’ European Journal
of Political Research, 12 (1984), 73–88; John Huber and Ronald Inglehart, ‘Expert Interpretations of Party Space
and Party Location in 42 Societies’, Party Politics, 1 (1995), 73–111.
42 Hooghe et al., ‘Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions?’; Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen, eds,
European Integration and Political Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
43 Budge et al., eds, Mapping Policy Preferences.
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problems in using manifesto data to place parties in an ideological space, since parties may
be using manifestos not for the purpose of ideological differentiation but to maximize the
saliency to voters of issues most associated with the party. Moreover, it is difficult to know
which of the several dozen policy issues to choose when determining the left–right ‘meta
dimension’ or ‘super dimension.’44
I also make use of the manifesto data in this study to place parties in left–right space.
Budge and his collaborators devised a formula for determining the left–right location from
their data on specific policy categories. They do this by subtracting the left content of
manifestos from the right content of manifestos. But this requires them to make a
judgement on which categories are left, which are right, and which are neither and should
be left out. Their selection of manifesto categories may be criticized. On the one hand, it
is unclear why certain policy positions are associated with only one side of the spectrum,
such as favourable statements about constitutionalism for right parties, and favourable
mention of peaceful settlements with left parties. On the other hand, they leave policy
positions out that should arguably be associated with one side of the spectrum or the other.
For example, statements in favour of corporatism, Keynesian demand management,
Marxist economic analysis and social justice should on the face of it be associated with
the left side of the equation, but they are not. Likewise, negative statements about labour
groups should plausibly be associated with right parties, but the Budge schema does not
do so.
Therefore, I do not use their selection of manifesto categories to determine left–right
location. Instead I select thirty manifesto categories (thirteen right and seventeen left), and
compute ideological location by subtracting left from right in the same manner as Budge
and colleagues. Why these thirty categories? They were chosen because the literature
suggests (1) that these policy positions are clearly either left or right, and (2) that there is
a correlation between them and position on European integration. Socialists (those who
believe in Keynesian economic policies and redistribution) are widely believed to have
opposed European integration because of its market orientation. Those adhering to national
symbols are also linked in the literature to anti-integrationist sentiments because of their
belief that integration erodes national identity and power. It is important to note that no
external policy issues (with the arguable exception of support for military spending) are
included in the recalculated left–right scale. The reason for leaving them out is to avoid
any possible circular influence on integration preferences. Determining party ideology
using the policy categories I have chosen yields a closer correlation to party preferences
on integration than using the policy categories chosen by Budge et al. (see Table 5). Given
the extremely robust findings of a link between party ideology and integration support, this
is a further reason it seems to make sense to use these selected categories to calculate
government ideology.
Thus, because there is no a priori reason to assume the superiority of either expert
surveys or manifesto data for determining ideology, I use both methods. The level of
covariation between the manifesto left–right positions and the left–right positions derived
from expert surveys is not as high as one might expect given that they are purporting to
44 Most scholars either adopt a specific and clear view about what the policy content of left–right space is (i.e.,
economic intervention v. free enterprise) or they assume that ideology constrains parties’ positioning such that
there are logical connections between a party’s position on various different policy issues. See Gabel and Huber,
‘Putting Parties in Their Place’.
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TABLE 5 Party Ideology Correlated with Party Preference on EU Integration
Independent variables – manifesto data
Dependent
variables – Left–right Distance from Left–right Distance from
party placement from centre from placement from centre from
preferences on Budge policy Budge policy Aspinwall policy Aspinwall policy
EU integration categories categories categories categories
Expert survey 0.138** 0.278** 0.265** 0.452**
(N436)
Manifesto 0.008 0.164** 0.046*  0.152**
(N1,991)
*p0.05, **p0.01, ***p0.001.
measure the same thing.45 It would seem that expert judgements of party ideology and party
manifesto measures are not measuring parties by the same yardstick, which is no bad thing,
since it gives us two relatively independent (of each other) explanatory variables. Both the
expert survey method and the manifesto method of determining party ideology produce
a value on a scale from 1 to 100. Since I am interested not simply in a linear left–right space
but also in the effect of moving from the centre to the extremes, I calculate a new variable
which measures political party ideology as a function of its distance from the centre of
left–right space (non-centrism).46
The relationship between party ideology and party support for integration is now widely
accepted, and has been shown in numerous empirical studies to have validity across time
and member state.47 The purpose here is to extend our understanding of this relationship
from party ideology to government ideology. In doing so it is necessary to interpolate
government ideology values for years where there are no data. The manifesto party
ideology measure is available only for election years, while the expert survey data are
available only at irregular intervals.48 Party ideology measures are completed by
45 The R value is 0.399 (N234, significant at the 0.01 level). A further test is to examine the relationship
between the manifesto variable on European Community support and the expert survey results from Ray,
‘Measuring Party Orientations’, on the level of support for integration for each party. The results show some
relationship between the two variables (R0.442). The nearest election data were used to compare party
integration preferences from the expert survey, and the percentage of statements in favour of European integration
derived from the Budge dataset. Where the Ray expert survey data fell exactly between two elections, the previous
manifesto data were used. Though statistically significant at the 0.01 level, it would seem that experts were not
thinking of party manifesto statements alone when they made their judgements as to a party’s position on European
integration.
46 Interestingly, a simple bivariate correlation between the expert survey measure of non-centrism and an expert
survey measure of party support for integration yields a correlation of 0.772, significant at the 0.01 level
(N671). The relationship is negative, as expected: the more non-centrist a party, the less it supports European
integration. Using the same left–right data as the independent variable without converting it to distance from centre
yields a correlation of only 0.156. In other words, as far as the expert survey measure of parties is concerned, what
seems to matter is not whether a party is left or right but how far it is from the political centre.
47 Hooghe et al., ‘Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions?’; Ray, ‘Measuring Party Orientations’; Aspinwall,
‘Preferring Europe’.
48 It is also important to note that there are some differences between the datasets in terms of parties covered.
The Marks/Steenbergen expert survey is more comprehensive in terms of contemporary parties, including smaller
regional, extremist, single-issue and movement parties that are absent from the Budge dataset. In practice this
should not affect outcomes since these parties were not present in governing coalitions.
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interpolation and, using Woldendorp et al.’s data on government composition, government
ideology values are extracted from these interpolations.49 Information is included for both
the French president and the French government, because of the former’s importance in
foreign policy. Finally, the government ideology scores are lagged by one year. Many of
the elections occurred well into a given year, with governments taking office late in the
year or even in the following year, and it is reasonable to assume that the effects on policy
would be delayed slightly.
FINDINGS
Support for European Integration in the Council of Ministers
Bivariate correlation analysis shows several important patterns. First, information on
government ideology from the manifesto database provided a better correlate of support
for these Council proposals than the expert surveys. Secondly, knowing the position of
governments in linear left–right space provided a stronger correlate than knowing its
distance from the centre of left–right space.50 Appendix Table A1 shows the bivariate
correlations. Thirdly, trade and public opinion were only modestly correlated to Council
positions. However, they do correlate to each other to some extent.51 The level of net
disbursements to member states correlates to positions in the Council (R0.361), and even
more strongly to public opinion about the benefits of the European Union (R0.659).
With this information, a multivariate regression model was constructed using the five
explanatory variables (see Table 6). Ideological position is statistically significant for one
of the model specifications – manifesto-derived position in left–right space. The
relationship is negative: government support for integration declines as it moves from left
to right. This supports the hypothesis predicting a linear relationship (Hypothesis 5). A
stepwise regression removes all variables except government ideology. When expert
survey-derived government ideology is used instead of manifesto, the variables net
transfers, trade and public opinion are the significant ones, and the rest excluded. The result
is very important for our understanding of the causes of government positions, because
it demonstrates the predictive importance of government ideology as measured by
manifesto statements. Interestingly, although the linearity of this relationship is similar to
that reported by Mattila, my results show that the manifesto-derived ideology measure is
a stronger predictor than the expert survey-derived measure. Mattila only examines an
expert survey-derived measure.52
Net payments to member states is significant in all the models (though the error term
is high), and there is a positive relationship: as payments increase, so does support for
Council decisions. In other words, controlling for other variables, EU payments have a
49 Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge, ‘Party Government in 20 Democracies’, European Journal
of Political Research, special issue, 24 (1993), 1–119; Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge, ‘Party
Government in 20 Democracies – An Update (1990–1995)’, European Journal of Political Research, 33 (1998),
125–64.
50 Bivariate correlation between manifesto-derived government left–right ideology and support for Council
measures was the highest of all the independent variables (R 0.515, sig. 0.001).
51 Trade and public opinion were correlated to Council decisions at 0.263 and 0.217 respectively, both
significant at 0.05, N92. Lagging the trade data by a year reduces its correlation to Council decisions. The
bivariate trade–public opinion correlation is 0.396, significant at 0.01, N89.
52 Mattila ‘Contested Decisions’.
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strong influence on government support for measures in the Council of Ministers. This
result is at odds with Mattila’s findings, in which net payments to member states are not
significant. He surmises that high covariance between this variable and the variable of
government support for integration may be the reason net payments fall out in regression
analysis. Member states that have high levels of net receipts also have governments highly
supportive of integration.
In my analysis, trade is also positively correlated, as expected, but the level of
significance is low in all but one model. The hypothesis that trade linkages may promote
positive government preferences towards integration is not supported by the evidence. The
public opinion variable shows a negative relationship, the opposite of what we expected,
though the coefficient is very low and the relationship is not significant. Experience in the
Second World War appears to have no influence on government support for Council
measures. Whatever the claims of analysts who ascribe integration support to wartime
experience, these data do not support such a link. Using Second World War deaths instead
of Second World War status increases the R2 to 0.444 for the full model, but the variable
Second World War deaths is not significant as a variable itself.
Interestingly, these independent variables are less successful at predicting government
positions on all Council measures (instead of just those where negative votes or abstentions
were recorded). The significance level is far lower, meaning that the relationship between
independent variable and dependent variable is more likely to be random. This may be
because the former (i.e., all Council measures) were less contested and therefore less
subject to differences in national preferences. Many of these measures are technical,
uncontroversial housekeeping acts with no significance for national interests. In any case,
variables measuring differences in domestic circumstances are more powerful predictors
where Council decisions are contentious.
Support for European Integration in the Amsterdam IGC Negotiations
Turning to the Amsterdam IGC positions, a different pattern emerges. First, expert
survey-derived information on the ideology of governments is a better correlate than the
manifesto-derived ideology, the reverse of the case for Council of Ministers. Secondly,
knowing the government’s ideological distance from the centre of left–right space is not
as good a correlate of Amsterdam positions as knowing its position in linear left–right space
(although some of the correlations are very close). Thirdly, Second World War experience
is also a good correlate to government positions in the Amsterdam negotiations. Second
World War ‘losers’ are more likely to support integration than ‘winners’. Net transfers and
public opinion are somewhat weaker correlates, and trade is not correlated to Amsterdam
positions in a statistically significant way. Appendix Table A2 shows bivariate
correlations. All the significance levels are lower than for the Council of Ministers data
because of the lower N (16) for the Amsterdam negotiations. The number of observations
equals one per member state government, plus one for the French president, an important
decision maker in foreign policy matters.
Multivariate regression models were constructed to test the explanatory power of
ideology, trade, net payments, Second World War experience, and public opinion on
member states’ positions on the Amsterdam negotiations (see Table 6). None of the
ideological variables are statistically significant. Interestingly, Second World War
experience and net payments show a far stronger relationship to government positions than
ideology, though the error term is very high. Second World War experience is the only
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variable that achieves statistical significance. However, removing the outlying United
Kingdom from the dataset reduces this significance, and reduces the explanatory value of
the full model. British negativism plays a large part in driving this relationship. Using
Second World War deaths in place of Second World War experience does not increase the
predictive value of this model. Trade also appears to predict government positions: the
higher the levels of trade with EU partners, the more likely it is that governments will
support integration. The relationship between public opinion and government positions
again appears to be negative: the less supportive public opinion is, the more supportive
governments are. However, the population of cases is very small, unfortunately, and this
weakens the significance of the results.
UNDERSTANDING GOVERNMENT PREFERENCES ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
One of the most striking findings of this study appears to be that different factors affect
government choice in Council of Ministers and IGC deliberations. Party ideologies
translate to government positions when considering Council decisions. This issue is
important because most theories of government preference formation downplay
ideological competition in favour of explanations focusing on specific national interests.53
However, other potential means of representing the national interest – especially net
receipts of EU funds and national experience in Second World War – yield some evidence
that governments are abandoning ideological views when they choose policies on Europe.
This is especially the case in the IGC leading to the Amsterdam Treaty.
Why is there a difference in the ability of independent variables to explain the decisions
of the Council of Ministers versus the IGC? Bearing in mind that these results are tentative,
one possible reason is that the Amsterdam negotiations, like all IGCs, are higher profile
and likely to attract greater media and public scrutiny than the more workaday Council
voting. If this is the case, governments may be more careful to represent the ‘national
interest’ in IGCs, whereas they are more likely to be motivated by ideological
predispositions when their efforts are subject to less external scrutiny. This could explain
the high significance of the ‘Second World War experience’ variable. The media exposure
guaranteed by major intergovernmental conferences may cause leaders to act as guardians
of history and tradition, conforming to the view of many academics and policy makers that
historical experience is essential to understanding government preferences.
However, it could be that the difference between the two results may be explained by
the different types of proposals being considered – ‘high politics’ in the IGC and ‘low
politics’ in the Council. In an earlier paper I showed that foreign policy and defence issues
in the Amsterdam IGC were affected by traditional member state concerns, such as
neutrality and international power.54 Even member states that were highly supportive of
most Amsterdam proposals rejected foreign policy and defence strengthening in some
cases. Conversely, ‘low politics’ issues at Amsterdam, such as employment policy, are
more easily explained by government ideology than by Second World War experience
(I treat this in more detail below). In other words, some transfer of authority is contested
53 See Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmen-
talist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 (1993), 473–524; Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for
Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, ‘European Integration and
Supranational Governance’.
54 Aspinwall, ‘Preferring Europe’.
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on ideological grounds, while other transfer of authority is contested on territorial
grounds.55 Further process-tracing case studies may reveal the answers to these questions
more fully.
A further puzzle concerns the dimensionality of ideological influence on government
policy in the Council. Specifically, why do governments not display the same ‘inverted
U-curve’ of support/opposition to integration that parties display? Distance from centre
appears to be less important to governments than their location in linear left–right space.
Both ideological hypotheses predict downward sloping support for integration as one
moves from the centre to the right. The difference between them is on the left of the
ideological spectrum. The non-centrist (inverted U-curve) hypothesis predicts that support
for Europe will decline as one moves left. The linear hypothesis predicts that support for
Europe will increase as one moves left.
One possibility is that far-left parties, which are hostile to integration and which are
necessary to making the inverted U-curve work, are not exerting an influence on
governments, either because they are not part of government coalitions or because they
are a weak influence as outsiders. Additionally, it is possible that governments have been
influenced by the ‘new-left’ social democracy agenda, which is generally favourable to
integration, at least partly because the European agenda includes market-correcting
regulatory policies such as employment and environmental policies. The high support for
these policies among left of centre governments is evidence of such an effect.56
However, left–right ideology may be disaggregated into two dimensions. One is the
socio-economic dimension: economic interventionism versus economic liberalism. The
other is a liberties dimension: personal liberty versus moral traditionalism.57 Taking the
economic dimension first, left governments would be expected to support European
integration as the EU moved from being a market-oriented space to one in which ‘regulated
capitalism’ was pursued, through redistributive policies, including cohesion, environmen-
tal, employment and other policies designed to tame the excesses of market liberalism.
Conversely, right governments would oppose integration under these conditions for the
same reasons. Redistributive policies would interfere with the free working of the market,
reducing aggregate welfare.
On the liberties dimension, left governments are expected to oppose interference in
personal lifestyle choices, such as abortion rights, same sex marriage and adoption rights,
and other quality of life issues. The European Union has tended to promote a liberal policy
agenda of equal rights which would be favoured by left governments on this ideological
spectrum. Right governments favour moral traditionalism in which ‘appropriate’ standards
of behaviour are delineated. It is not clear a priori that it is necessary for the state to take
a role in promulgating and enforcing those standards. This role could be played by
churches, communities or families. But in practice it would appear that state authority is
strongly associated with this ideology, so that right governments support state authority
because it can delineate the proper limits to personal liberties.
55 For a more detailed discussion of these two dimensions, see Gary Marks, ‘European Integration and Political
Conflict’, in Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen, eds, European Integration and Political Conflict (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 235–59.
56 Hooghe et al., ‘Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions’.
57 For application of these ideological approaches to party views on Europe, see Hooghe et al., ‘Does Left/Right
Structure Party Position?’. For application to British MPs’ views on Europe, see Mark Aspinwall, ‘Commons
Sense: British MP Attitudes to European Integration’ (unpublished, Edinburgh University, 2005).
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Taking these two elements of left–right space together, left governments would favour
integration as the European Union moved into market-correcting economic policies and
extended its agenda of equal rights and liberal freedoms. Right governments would favour
integration as the European Union moved towards economic liberalism and market
freedoms, and provided scope for member states to exercise domestic power in lifestyle
areas. In practice, right governments may be critical of Europe not simply because of its
move away from market liberalization but also because it robs the state of autonomy. Left
governments may be supportive of Europe both because it has provided new policy areas
with which to counter full market liberalization and also because it enshrines a liberal ethos
of personal freedoms and equalities.
Measures of party ideology along the new politics and economic dimensions are both
weak predictors of preferences on EU integration.58 When these are translated into
government ideological measures (in the same manner as before), they also appear to be
weak predictors of government choice on both the Amsterdam Treaty and Council of
Ministers decisions. But are they better predictors of more refined decision making, on
‘new politics’ areas, such as environmental policy, and economic areas, such as
employment policy? I discuss this in more detail in the next section.
EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR REGULATED CAPITALISM
In this section I consider more refined policy and institutional preferences in the
Amsterdam Treaty: employment policy, environmental policy and strengthening the
European Parliament. The first two areas fall into what is often called ‘regulated
capitalism’, which refers to market-correcting policies designed to overcome inequities or
externalities due to market liberalization.
One plausible determining factor in government preferences on these measures is the
size of the welfare state.59 Member states with high levels of taxation as a percentage of
gross domestic product (GDP) will take a different view of the efficacy of integration
depending on how it affects their own circumstances.60 Governments with high welfare
state expenditure levels may resist market-opening measures and social policy measures
which reduce their ability to provide public services. Likewise, states with high welfare
state expenditure may support regulated capitalism at the European level because it
increases their competitiveness vis-a`-vis other member states. If this is true, we can expect
support for measures of European integration to vary according to welfare state levels,
measured by taxation as a percentage of GDP.
Results suggest that welfare state levels show no correlation to member state decisions
in the Council. Moreover, welfare state spending does not add to our understanding of why
governments support employment policies or institutional strengthening proposals in the
Amsterdam Treaty. However, there is a significant relationship between welfare state
spending and support for environmental policies – namely that high spending states are
less inclined to support environmental policies, but there are too few cases to draw any
firm conclusions here. What else may be affecting government choice? Linear left–right
58 Regressing party economic ideology (from manifesto data) on party integration preferences (from survey
data) yields R20.054, sig. p0.001. Similarly, new politics ideology and party integration preferences yields
R20.018, sig. p0.01 (N435).
59 Welfare state levels are simply calculated from data on taxation as a percentage of GDP, available on the
OECD website.
60 Hix, The Political System.
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TABLE 7 Regulated Capitalism/European Parliament Models
Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam
positions, positions, positions,
employment environment strengthening
policies policies EP
Left–right
position, from 0.878** 0.794**  1.543*
expert survey (0.219) (0.180) (0.483)
data
Export levels 0.547 0.268 1.704
to EU (0.353) (0.379) (1.016)
Public opinion 0.373 0.194  0.174
on benefits of (0.241) (0.240) (0.643)
EU membership
Disbursements 3.527  7.413 5.151
to member (3.581) (3.081) (8.254)
states
Welfare state 0.320  1.762*  2.044
(0.671) (0.634) (1.700)
Second World 0.223 1.130 1.901
War II (2.674) (0.929) (2.490)
experience
R2 full
model 0.805* 0.829 0.799
N 16 16 16
Notes: Left–right position is lagged one year. For employment policies, status in the
Second World War better predicts decisions; for the environment and the European
Parliament, Second World War deaths better predicts positions. Significance:
*p 0.05, **p 0.01. Beta coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
position is an extremely reliable predictor of government support for strengthening
common employment and environmental policies (see Table 7). Unsurprisingly, left
governments support employment and environmental policies, while right governments
oppose them. Controlling for trade levels and public opinion only reduces the predictive
power by a small amount. This confirms the empirical findings of Hooghe et al. on
European political party positions regarding European regulated capitalism measures.
Manifesto-derived positions are not as strong. Distance from the ideological centre also
helps us predict positions on employment policies, but not with as much confidence as
left–right position. What is perhaps most remarkable is that a highly significant and strong
relationship is possible with sample size of only sixteen.
However, not all ideological measures are good predictors. Substituting new politics and
economic ideology measures in place of the broader left–right measure actually reduces
the predictive power greatly. Moreover, substituting public opinion on the need for EU
employment policies in place of general public approval of the European Union actually
reduces the explanatory power of the model, and is less significant than the broader opinion
measures. Finally, levels of disbursement from the European Union are only mildly
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correlated to support for employment policies at Amsterdam, and actually reduce the
explanatory value of government ideology in the full regression model.
Ideology is also the most important explanatory variable in positions on strengthening
the European Parliament and strengthening environmental policy. More refined measures
of public opinion do not increase the predictive power, nor do the new politics and
economic ideology variables. However, ideology is not a good predictor of all Amsterdam
policy areas. None of the ideological measures constructed here help us predict positions
on justice and home affairs, Common Foreign and Security Policy or defence policies.
Why are some Amsterdam proposals explained by ideology while others are not? One
way to answer this question is by looking more closely at public opinion. The public
opinion variable used in the multivariate regression model is a broad indicator of the
perceived benefits of EU membership to citizens of member states. However, there are
more refined data on public opinion. Citizens were polled in early 1997 on their support
for EU policies in defence, foreign policy, immigration, asylum, environment, employ-
ment and strengthening the European Parliament. Because this was at the same time that
interim government positions were recorded by the EP, it is worth looking for relationships
between these more refined public opinion variables and government preferences.
Table 8 reports the findings of simple bivariate correlations between public opinion and
government position in the Amsterdam negotiations. Little relationship exists except in the
areas of defence and foreign policy. Using these variables in the multivariate models does
little to improve their predictive power. Except in the case of defence, ideology is still a
better predictor than public opinion. European citizens polled by Eurobarometer show a
strong correlation in views on defence to the positions taken by member state governments.
The relationship is slightly weaker for foreign policy, and for other policy areas and
strengthening the European Parliament, the relationship is very weak. This may be due to
a strong coincidence of popular and elite views about the historically appropriate and
TABLE 8 Public Opinion and Government Positions on Amsterdam
Government positions
Foreign
Defence policy JHA Environ Employ EP
Defence 0.797**
Foreign 0.504*
Public policy
opinion
on EU Asylum 0.318
measures
Immigration 0.278
Environment 0.159
Employment 0.014
EP 0.262
Notes: Correlation coefficients (R) are reported in the table. N16. Significance: *p 0.05,
**p 0.01.
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efficient locus of military power. Foreign and defence policy are less likely to generate
conflict within than between member states.61 Table 4 makes clear that the traditional
neutral states (Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland) opposed much of the defence agenda
at Amsterdam, despite their support for integration in other areas. Strong foreign policy
powers such as Britain and France also resisted integration in the foreign policy area,
possibly because of their independent powers and status in this area.
CONCLUSION
This article has compared two versions of government choice on Europe: an intergovern-
mental conference and decisions in the Council of Ministers. It found marked differences
in predictability; government ideology and financial transfers are the best predictors in the
Council; Second World War experience and financial transfers are the best predictors in
the Amsterdam IGC. It has extended Aspinwall on the Amsterdam IGC, and Mattila on
the Council, and most importantly, provided a means of comparing different decision-
making fora. It has not considered the possible effects of inter-state bargaining or strategic
interaction on government preferences. The flow of causality is from the domestic arena
upwards. This has enabled a robust statistical analysis to be performed, but also limits the
significance of the findings to domestic factors alone.
In terms of the influence of ideology, this article enables us to extend research done on
political party support for European integration: namely, in the case of government policy
choice in the Council of Ministers, leftists choose co-operation, rightists choose autonomy.
The reason for this is likely to be the turn towards market-correcting policies by the
European Union, including cohesion, employment and environmental policies. It may also
be caused by the pro-liberal freedoms and rights agenda of the European Union and the
loss of sovereignty faced by member states, which is particularly problematic for rightist
governments. The article also suggests that we may reject the hypothesis that ideological
non-centrism matters to governments’ positions on integration.
One final point may be made about how this research corresponds to existing literature
on ideology and integration preferences. It concerns the conclusion drawn by Gary Marks
about the differences between parties and governments.62 Marks characterizes patterns of
contestation in two dimensions. One dimension captures the level of difference in domestic
distributional impact of an EU policy. The other dimension captures the level of difference
in inter-country distributional impact. He goes on to suggest that parties see European
integration through an ideological prism, and respond to it on that basis. Governments,
because they mobilize territorial interests, are more likely to respond to distributions of
power among the member states, and also between member states and the European Union
itself.
However, the data examined here imply that the distinction between parties and
governments is not as sharp as one might think. Governments, like parties, respond in an
ideological manner to policy decisions in the Council of Ministers, but not always in an
ideological manner to policy decisions in the IGC, where territorial shifts in competences,
such as foreign and defence policy, may be more likely. Governments are made up of
parties, who appear to bring their ideological predispositions to government policy choice.
Governments represent both territory and ideology.
61 Marks, ‘European Integration and Political Conflict’.
62 Marks, ‘European Integration and Political Conflict’.
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